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INTRODUCTION  
 
Many times when a business files for bankruptcy under the United 
States Bankruptcy Code no assets remain for the debtor’s general 
unsecured creditors.1 This lack of assets leaves the pre-bankruptcy 
creditors scrambling to find someone to compensate them for their 
resulting losses.2 Who might that someone be? Not the debtor’s 
professionals, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit.3 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2009, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Eastern Illinois University, magna cum laude, B.A., May 2006.  
1 See Steve Jakubowski, 7th Circuit Nixes Attempts to Hold Investment Bankers 
Responsible for Matters Beyond Their Engagement Agreements, BANKRUPTCY 
LITIGATION BLOG, Aug. 25, 2008, 
http://www.bankruptcylitigationblog.com/archives/cat-litigation-lore. See generally 
Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-9036 (2006). 
2 See Jakubowski supra note 1. 
3 See e.g., Fehribach v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 493 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Rovner, I., concurring); HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities 
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Businesses have the option of outsourcing their accounting or 
financial advising needs to specialized firms, rather than conduct these 
services in-house.4 This Article refers to these firms as the debtor’s 
professionals. After filing for bankruptcy, there is no longer a need for 
these professionals as the bankrupt business is liquidated.5 This 
liquidation may occur in either a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding—
where the main goal is not to save the dying company but rather to 
liquidate its remaining assets and close its doors for good—or in a 
Chapter 11 proceeding—where the plan of reorganization may provide 
for liquidation.6 Although the bankrupt company’s pre-bankruptcy 
professionals are no longer employed by the debtor business, all ties 
between the two may not be completely severed. The trustee, 
stockholders, or other interested parties may try to recover from these 
professionals based on their alleged contribution to the business’s 
demise—which is similar to what occurred in three cases recently 
decided by the Seventh Circuit.7  
In Fehribach v. Ernst & Young, LLP, the court held that the 
debtor’s accounting firm was not negligent in failing to include a 
going-concern qualification in its audit report.8 Similarly, in The 
HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, the 
court stated that the debtor’s investment banker was not grossly 
negligent in issuing a fairness opinion that used unsound financial 
projections.9 Finally, in Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., the Seventh 
                                                                                                                   
(USA), LLC, 517 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2008); Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 538 
F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2008).  
4 See generally, Brad L. Peterson, When and Why Companies Outsource and 
Offshore, in, OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING 2008 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks, & Literary Property, Course Handbook Series Order No. 14714, 
2008)(discussing the general advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing).  
5 See generally, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE 
LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 369 (5th ed. 2006) (describing the general 
purpose behind liquidation).  
6 Id. at 369, 395.  
7 Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 908; HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 456; 
Joyce, 538 F.3d at 799.  
8 493F.3d at 909-10.  
9 517 F.3d at 457.  
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Circuit rejected the stockholders’ attempt to hold the business’s 
financial advisor liable based on a fairness opinion issued in 
connection with the business’s proposed merger.10  
The Seventh Circuit is not the only circuit court to consider the 
question of whether these third party professionals can be held liable, 
and if so under what causes of action. Other courts, in addition to the 
Seventh Circuit, have dealt with cases brought against these 
professionals under a variety of causes of action, all of which come 
with their own potential weaknesses.11 The causes of action that will 
be discussed in greater length throughout this Article are deepening 
insolvency and standard tort theories such as negligence and 
constructive fraud. While all of the above theories of liability—along 
with claims for breach of contract—were rejected in Fehribach, The 
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce, other Circuits have taken 
differing views, both in considering the controversial theory of 
deepening insolvency and in determining whether there should be a 
privity requirement attached to a third party’s ability to bring a tort 
claim against an outside professional.12  
Part I of this Article presents a brief background of what a 
bankruptcy filed under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code entails, which is provided to explain why a trustee 
may feel the need to file suit against these pre-bankruptcy 
professionals. Part II of this Article examines how these professionals 
have fared in other circuits and lower federal courts by considering the 
various causes of action they have been sued under—specifically, 
deepening insolvency and causes of action under standard tort law. 
Part III of this Article provides a detailed background of Fehribach, 
The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce and also examines the 
                                                 
10 538 F.3d at 802. Although Joyce was not initiated in connection with a 
bankruptcy proceeding, the issues decided by the court, in the author’s opinion are 
both similar to and will have a direct impact on the potential for liability of a 
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals. Thus, Joyce will be discussed throughout this 
Article as if the losses suffered by the stockholders are equivalent to the losses 
suffered through bankruptcy in Fehribach and HA2003 Liquidating Trust.  
11 See infra note 36, 57 and accompanying text.  
12 See e.g. infra note 44, 46, 52, 62 and accompanying text.  
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Seventh Circuit’s reasoning and holdings in each of those cases. 
Finally, Part IV concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s unwillingness to 
hold a third-party professional liable for the mistakes of management 
in the aforementioned cases is a step in the right direction. However, 
an analytical framework for analyzing claims against these 
professionals is necessary, and Part IV of this Article proposes that the 
framework used should be analogous to the law as it pertains to 
lenders in the context of equitable subordination, under which, these 
professionals would only be held liable under strict circumstances but 
would not escape liability under all circumstances.  
 
I. COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE CODE: A GENERAL 
OVERVIEW  
 
A. Chapter 7 Liquidation 
 
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is what is known 
as “primal bankruptcy” because it reflects the most basic purpose of 
bankruptcy law as a response to a defaulting business.13 A corporation 
that enters a Chapter 7 proceeding will see all of its assets liquidated 
before it expires under state corporate law.14 This is in stark contrast to 
a case filed under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, where the 
intention is to reorganize the struggling corporation so that it may 
hopefully emerge from the bankruptcy both leaner and with a reduced 
debt burden.15  
A corporation may find itself in a Chapter 7 proceeding either 
voluntarily or involuntarily.16 A business may choose to voluntarily 
file a Chapter 7 petition, enabling it to liquidate its assets in an orderly 
                                                 
13 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS 
AND CREDITORS 372 (5th ed. 2006).  
14 Id. at 369.  
15 Id. A plan of reorganization in a Chapter 11 proceeding can, however, 
provide for the liquidation of the debtor’s assets. Id. at 395.  
16 Id. at 374-75.  
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fashion because the automatic stay will take effect.17 However, 
because of the drastic consequences of filing a Chapter 7 petition, 
many businesses wait until the last possible moment to file—all too 
often when the value of the company has already been depleted 
beyond saving.18 A business may also find itself in a Chapter 7 
proceeding against its will if an involuntary petition is filed by its 
creditors.19 Involuntary petitions are rare and section 303 of the 
Bankruptcy Code makes them relatively difficult to file by including 
various requirements such as the three-creditor rule—which requires 
that at least three creditors join in the involuntary petition.20  
Once a petition is filed a trustee in bankruptcy is appointed to 
liquidate and administer the assets of the bankruptcy estate.21 Many 
Chapter 7 proceedings, however, are considered “no-asset” 
bankruptcies—meaning there is simply nothing left for the trustee to 
administer.22 This lack of assets may lead the trustee to file an action 
against the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals in an attempt to 
                                                 
17 Id. at 373. The automatic stay is a legal mandate which acts as a freeze on 
any and all attempts to collect a debt from the debtor and all civil litigation involving 
the rights of the debtor. Katelyn Knight, Comment, Equitable Mootness in 
Bankruptcy Appeals, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 253, 260-61 (2009). See also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 362 (2006).  
18 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 375. 
19 Id.; See also 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).  
20 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 375. 
21 Id. at 134. A trustee in bankruptcy is appointed by the U.S. Trustee, elected 
by creditors, or appointed by a judge to administer a bankruptcy estate. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). The bankruptcy estate is created with the 
commencement of a bankruptcy case and constitutes a legal entity separate from the 
debtor. The property which makes up the bankruptcy estate is protected by the 
automatic stay from claims of creditors and is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy court. Steve H. Federstein, Property of the Estate, in, UNDERSTANDING 
THE BASICS OF BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 2008, at 117 (PLI 
Comm. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series Order No. 14425, 2008) 
(Updating Author). See also 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).  
22 Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority 
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L. J. 857, 886 n. 107 (1996) 
(acknowledging that in the United States general unsecured creditors will receive 
nothing in bankruptcy eighty percent of the time and four-five cents on the dollar 
twenty percent of the time).  
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collect more money for the estate—which, in turn, means more money 
for creditors.23 
  
B. Chapter 11 Reorganization  
 
The central focus of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the reorganization 
of the struggling debtor.24 Such reorganization can include, for 
example, only paying back a certain percentage of bank loans or 
extending the amount of time a debtor has to pay back those loans 
under its previous agreements.25 Ultimately, however, a number of 
large debtor corporations liquidate through Chapter 11 by creating a 
plan of liquidation when a plan of reorganization is not feasible.26 A 
Chapter 11 case may also be converted to a Chapter 7 to effectuate a 
liquidation.27  
As with a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, a Chapter 11 
proceeding may also be commenced by either the filing of a voluntary 
or involuntary petition.28 Creditors may believe it’s necessary to put a 
business in a Chapter 11 proceeding to obtain important financial 
information or allow for the supervision of the debtor without forcing 
it to close its doors.29 The same requirements exist under section 303 
of the Bankruptcy Code for creditors attempting to push a business 
into a Chapter 11 proceeding as they do for Chapter 7 involuntary 
bankruptcies.30  
Once a case is commenced under Chapter 11, if no trustee is 
appointed, the debtor becomes a new legal entity known as the “debtor 
in possession.” 31 The debtor-in-possession is equivalent to the trustee 
                                                 
23 See Fehribach v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 493 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Rovner, J., concurring).  
24 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 395.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 412.  
28 Id. at 377.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).  
31 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 409.  
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in a Chapter 7 proceeding in terms of most of its powers and 
obligations in the bankruptcy.32  
The main goal of the debtor in possession is to formulate a 
feasible plan of reorganization. 33 A plan of reorganization can be 
confirmed by the bankruptcy court even though the plan’s terms do not 
provide for a distribution to general unsecured creditors, which 
explains why these creditors would want to bring an action against the 
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals—because bringing suit against 
those professionals may be the only way to find a deep-pocket to 
enable them to recover on their claims.34  
 
II. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THIRD PARTY 
PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR VARYING TREATMENT IN THE COURTS 
THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
 
As is true in the Seventh Circuit, the law pertaining to whether a 
debtor’s professionals can be held liable for a company’s plunge into 
bankruptcy varies depending on which cause of action the creditors 
utilize to make their case. Deepening insolvency, for example, is 
controversial by nature and has been treated as an independent tort, a 
theory of damages, or rejected completely depending on which court 
the theory is presented to.35 For other more standard tort theories—
such as negligence and fraud—the difference between the courts 
centers on the question of whether privity is a prerequisite to the 
                                                 
32 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006).  
33 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 14, at 609.  
34 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2006) (providing the requirements for confirmation of 
a plan of reorganization).  
35 See generally Diane F. Coffino & Charles H. Jeanfreau, Delaware Hits the 
Brakes: The Effect of Gheewalla and Trenwick on Creditor Claims, 17 J. BANKR. L. 
& PRAC. 1 ART. 3 (2008) (examining the rejection of deepening insolvency as an 
independent tort and its contentious existence as a damages theory); Sara E. Apel, 
Comment, In Too Deep: Why the Federal Courts Should Not Recognize Deepening 
Insolvency as a Cause of Action, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 85, 99-112 (2008) 
(discussing the current state of the law regarding deepening insolvency).  
65 
 
7
Johnson: Let's Get It Straight: The Effect of <em>Fehribach</em>, <em>The
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
assertion of a claim by a third party against an outside professional, 
which is determined by looking at the state law governing the action.36  
 
A. Deepening Insolvency: Cause of Action or Damages Theory? 
 
The theory of deepening insolvency argues that directors, officers, 
corporate affiliates, lenders, and third party advisors should be held 
liable to the corporation (for its creditors’ benefits) for their 
participation in deciding to continue operating financially distressed 
companies through borrowing rather than immediately recommending 
liquidation.37 In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit was the first court to recognize deepening insolvency as an 
independent tort in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. 
Lafferty & Co.38 In upholding the district court’s refusal to grant the 
outside advisor’s motion to dismiss, the court stated that it believed the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize deepening insolvency 
as a cause of action because the theory was becoming more 
universally accepted.39 The Third Circuit also reasoned that under 
Pennsylvania common law principles “where there is an injury, the 
law provides a remedy.”40 However, in rationalizing its creation of the 
new tort, the Lafferty court failed to cite to any specific state law on 
the subject.41  
Not all courts, however, have recognized the concept of 
deepening insolvency as an independent tort.42 The theory was first 
                                                 
36 John Michael Klamann & Bert Stephen Braud, Third Party Accountant 
Liability—Prospective Financial Statements Used in Securities Offerings, 45 AM. 
JUR. TRIALS 113, §38 (2008).  
37 Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35.  
38 267 F.3d 340 (3rd Cir. 2001); See also Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35; 
Apel, supra note 35, at 95.  
39 Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 352; See also Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35; 
Apel, supra note 35, at 95-96. 
40 Lafferty, 267 F.3d at 351; See also Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35.  
41 Apel, supra note 35, at 96.  
42 See Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 36; Russell C. Silberglied, Keep Your 
Deepening Insolvency Materials: Harmonizing Brown Schools with Radnor 
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used by the courts as a theory of damages, and while some courts 
rejected deepening insolvency as a cause of action, they continued to 
use it to form a measure of damages caused by either breach of duty or 
another tort.43 The idea of deepening insolvency as a damages theory 
originated in the Seventh Circuit in Schacht v. Brown, where the court 
rejected the proposition that a corporation could never sue to recover 
damages sustained through the prolongation of an insolvent 
corporation’s life.44  
The Third Circuit, however, seemed to reject deepening 
insolvency as a damages theory and also backtracked on its Lafferty 
decision in In re CitX Corp. 45 In CitX, the court considered whether 
the plaintiff could ask for damages based on deepening insolvency in 
conjunction with his underlying malpractice claim.46 The court noted 
that causation for deepening insolvency damages was difficult to 
prove—and was not proven by the plaintiff—and therefore, would be 
unlikely to be a preferred method of calculating damages.47 The CitX 
court also attempted to narrow its previous holding in Lafferty—that 
deepening insolvency could stand as an independent cause of action—
by stating that the cause of action requires a pleading of fraud.48 By 
                                                                                                                   
Holdings and Post-CitX Case Law: Part I, 27-SEP AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 61 
(2008).  
43 See e.g., Coffino & Jeanfreau, supra note 35, n. 65; In re Greater Southeast 
Community Hospital Corp. I, 353 B.R. 324, 338 (Bankr. D. D.C. 2006) (deepening 
insolvency was treated as it was meant to be—a theory of harm); In re Southwest 
Florida Heart Group P.A., 346 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (deepening 
insolvency claim was only relevant to measure of damages and was not a cause of 
action standing alone); In re Flagship Healthcare, Inc., 269 B.R. 721, 728 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 2001) (deepening insolvency may be used in negligence action as a 
measure of damages).  
44 711 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Apel, supra note 35, at 88.  
45 Seitz v. Detweiler, Hershey & Assocs., P.C. (In re CitX Corp.), 448 F.3d 
672 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Silberglied, supra note 42, at 61 (CitX limited the 
principle that even if deepening insolvency was not an independent tort, it could be 
viewed as a damages theory).  
46 CitX, 448 F.3d at 674. 
47 Id. at 678; See also Apel, supra note 35, at 101-02.  
48 CitX, 448 F.3d at 680-81. See also Apel, supra note 35, at 102. 
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deeming fraud as a necessary component of a deepening insolvency 
claim, the Third Circuit highlighted the major flaw of the theory—
deepening insolvency simply duplicates other existing causes of 
action.49  
The Third Circuit’s decisions in Lafferty and CitX have been 
interpreted narrowly by some federal courts in their support for 
deepening insolvency as either a cause of action or a damages 
theory.50 The history of the theory, however, illustrates its 
controversial nature, and some federal courts have chosen to reject 
deepening insolvency altogether—whether pleaded as an independ
tort or a damages theory.
ent 
aw 
ative defense.  
                                                
51 Courts choosing to reject the theory have 
primarily relied on four grounds to do so: (1) the absence of state l
supporting the theory, (2) the business judgment rule, (3) a lack of 
standing, and (4) in pari delicto as an affirm 52
Although there is a trend toward complete rejection of the theory 
of deepening insolvency, the precedent laid down in Lafferty continues 
to create confusion among federal courts.53 This is especially true 
because the Lafferty decision itself, while recognizing deepening 
 
49 Coffino& Jeanfreau, supra note 35.  
50 Apel, supra note 35, at 113-14. Much of the litigation over whether 
deepening insolvency is a cause of action, damages theory, or neither has taken place 
in the Third Circuit. Richard I. Aaron, An Overview of Bankruptcy Choices Under 
Chapter 7, Chapter 11, Chapter 12, and Chapter 13, 1 BKRFUND §1.7, n. 1.10 
(2008).  
51 See In re Global Serv. Group, 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004). But see 
In re Del-Met Corp., 322 B.R. 781 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005).  
52 Apel, supra note 35, at 99-100. The business judgment rule is the 
presumption that officers and directors of a company make their business decisions 
on an informed good faith basis while acting with an honest belief that they are 
doing what is best for their company. Under the business judgment rule, 
disinterested directors will not be subjected to liability for decisions that were proven 
unwise. D.J. (Jan) Baker, John Wm. (Jack) Butler, Jr., & Mark A. McDermott, 
Corporate Governance of Troubled Companies and the Role of Restructuring 
Counsel, 63 BUS. LAW. 855, 857 (2008). In pari delicto means “equal fault” and, as 
such, is the basis for a court’s denial of relief. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2004). 
53 Apel, supra note 35, at 112.  
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insolvency as a cause of action, failed to set forth the actual elements 
of the claim.54 Therefore, a difference exists in what the tort of 
deepening insolvency actually entails even among courts recognizing 
the cause of action.55 Unfortunately, sorting through the muddled law 
relating to deepening insolvency does little to add clarity to exactly 
when a third party professional can be held liable for the tort or the 
resulting damages based on an underlying cause of action.  
 
B. Standard Tort Theories: Privity Problems 
 
In a state that completely rejects the theory of deepening 
insolvency, there are usually a number of other causes of action a 
creditor may attempt to hold the third party professional liable under.56 
Standard common law tort theories such as negligence and fraud are 
common causes of action for creditors seeking to hold an advisor or 
accountant liable for their losses stemming from a corporation’s 
liquidation.57 Historically, however, Justice Cardozo’s seminal 
decision in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche made it more difficult to hold 
outsiders who were not in privity with the plaintiff liable under a 
negligence theory.58 In Ultramares, the action for misrepresentation 
(both negligent and fraudulent) was brought against a third party 
accounting firm to recover a loss the plaintiffs allegedly suffered as a 
result of reliance on an audit prepared by that firm.59 The court, 
however, refused to find that the law should admit “to liability in an 
                                                 
54 Id. at 113.  
55 Id.  
56 See generally Klamann & Braud, supra note 37 (specifying the various 
potential causes of actions or theories a third party accountant can be held liable 
under).  
57 See Id. at §38. While creditors also tend to file breach of contract actions 
against third party professionals, those actions will not be discussed in this section 
but will rather only be discussed in the context of the Seventh Circuit’s decisions in 
Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce.  
58 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931); Klamann & Braud, supra note 37, at §38.  
59 174 N.E. at 442.  
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indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class” and thus held that the accounting firm was not liable.60 
Many courts disfavor Ultramares, however, and stemming from 
that disfavor a number of varying positions have arisen concerning 
whether a professional can be held liable to a third party under tort 
theories.61  
A number of courts have rejected what is known as the strict 
privity rule espoused in Ultramares and have instead taken the 
position advocated by the Restatement (2d) of Torts §552.62 The 
Restatement’s view has been embraced by as many as nineteen states, 
and is now considered the majority view.63 This view provides that a 
third party to a contract can recover for losses suffered as a result of 
misinformation if that third party is part of a narrow group that the 
misinformer knows its client will channel the information to as part of 
a particular business transaction or a substantially similar business 
transaction.64  
                                                 
60 Id. at 444.  
61 Klamann & Braud, supra note 37, at §38.  
62 Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So.2d 1007, 1012 (La. 1993).  
63 Barrie, 625 So.2d at 1013.  
64 Id. at 1014. Section 552 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts provides:  
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a 
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of 
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence 
in obtaining or communicating the information. (2) Except as 
stated in Subsection (3), the liability in Subsection (1) is limited to 
loss suffered (a) by the person or one or more of a limited group of 
persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the 
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) 
through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or 
in a substantially similar transaction. (3) The liability of one who is 
under a public duty to give the information extends to the loss 
suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty 
70 
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In contrast, the minority view is referred to the “akin to privity” 
view.65 Courts using this restrictive view extend liability for economic 
loss only if the defendant is in a relationship with the plaintiff that is 
deemed “akin to privity.”66 This rule stemmed from the Ultramares 
decision and a modification of that rule in Credit Alliance Corp. v. 
Arthur Andersen & Co., requiring “linking conduct” on the 
defendant’s part.67 The scope of the defendant’s duty as defined by the 
“akin to privity” rule depends on both the defendant’s state of mind 
and the parties’ mutual expectations in the underlying contract.68 The 
minority rule differs from the majority rule in that it requires the 
precise identity of the third party to be foreseen by the defendants, 
while the majority view only requires that a narrow group—not the 
precise membership of that group—be foreseen by the defendants.69 
Lastly, courts willing to take an expansive view on the privity 
question adhere to the foreseeability rule when determining potential 
professional liability to third parties. Under this rule, third parties can 
recover “to the extent that damages incurred by non-clients are 
reasonably foreseeable.”70 Therefore, liability can be extended to all 
reasonably foreseeable plaintiffs who suffered an economic loss based 
on an actual and justifiable reliance on a negligent misrepresentation; 
thereby doing away with the notion of privity altogether. At least three 
courts follow the foreseeability view in determining potential liability 
for professionals to third party plaintiffs.71  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to 
protect them. Restatement (Second) of Torts §552 (1977).  
65 Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1013.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. See 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985).  
68 Barrie, 625 So.2d at 1013.  
69 Id. at 1014.  
70 Id. at 1013.  
71 Id.  
71 
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III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S TAKE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AS SET 
FORTH IN ITS RECENT DECISIONS 
 
A. Fehribach v. Ernst & Young 
 
Fehribach v. Ernst & Young LLP was initiated with the filing of an 
adversary complaint by the trustee in bankruptcy against the debtor’s 
accounting firm. 72 The complaint alleged causes of action for both 
negligence and breach of contract for the accounting firm’s failure to 
include a going-concern qualification in the audit report the firm had 
prepared for the debtor, Taurus Foods, Inc. 73 Taurus Foods was a 
small distributor of frozen meats and other foods before it was forced 
into an involuntary bankruptcy by three of its creditors.74 In October 
of 1995, Ernst & Young, acting in its capacity as auditor for Tauru
Foods, prepared an audit report for Taurus’s 1995 fiscal year, which 
ran from January 1994 through January 1995.
s 
 on 
                                                
75 In that report, Ernst & 
Young indicated that there was no “substantial doubt” that Taurus’s 
business was capable of continuing as a going concern until at least 
January of 1996. 76 
In May of 1996, Taurus’s principal banker, Bank One, became 
alarmed at the company’s financial condition and transferred the 
account to an office specializing in risky loans.77 After the account 
was transferred, the new office began imposing greater restrictions
Taurus, and its financial deterioration continued at an increased pace.78 
 
72 493 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2007) (Rovner, J., concurring). Adversary 
proceedings are subactions of a bankruptcy case that arise within the bankruptcy 
case. Joseph J. Bassano, et.al., Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Practice, 9 AM. JUR. 2D 
BANKRUPTCY §87 (2008).  
73 Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 907. Going concern is defined as “a commercial 
enterprise actively engaging in business with the expectation of indefinite 
continuance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
74 Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 907. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 907-08 
77 Id. at 908.  
78 Id. 
72 
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In an effort to rescue the company from its demise, the Chief Financial 
Officer began to defraud Bank One by inflating the company’s sales 
and accounts receivable in the daily reports Taurus was required to 
present to the bank.79 Shortly after the fraud was exposed, Taurus was 
pushed into a Chapter 7 liquidation.80  
In filing its complaint against Ernst & Young, the trustee alleged 
that the auditor was negligent in failing to include a going-concern 
qualification in the audit report for the 1995 fiscal year.81 Using expert 
evidence, the trustee argued that had the going-concern qualification 
been included in the report, the owners of the company (who also 
acted as the managers) would have realized the company could not 
survive and would have immediately liquidated.82 An earlier 
liquidation, the trustee claimed, would have avoided the cost of 
operating under Bank One’s restrictions—to the tune of $3 million 
dollars.83 Ernst & Young moved for summary judgment in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, which was 
granted on its behalf.84 The trustee then appealed to the Seventh 
Circuit.85  
Judge Richard A. Posner wrote the court’s opinion in Fehribach, 
which was decided by the Seventh Circuit on July 17, 2007.86 The 
alleged claims of negligence and breach of contract were governed by 
Indiana’s Accountancy Act of 2001.87 The Seventh Circuit classified 
the trustee’s theory of damages in the case as one based on the 
controversial “deepening insolvency” theory.88 While recognizing that 
the theory of deepening insolvency could be invoked in certain 
                                                 
79 Id. Taurus’s Chief Financial Officer, Lisa Corry (who was also the daughter 
of one of Taurus’s owners) was convicted of fraud and sentenced to prison. Id. at 
908 (citing United States v. Corry, 206 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2000).  
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 907.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 905.  
87 Id. at 907.  
88 Id. at 908.  
73 
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cases—such as in a case where the management worked with the 
outsider to conceal the corporation’s decrepit financial status—the 
court noted that it did not make sense to hold a third party liable under 
the theory when the third party invested in the firm to keep it going 
and the investment was misused by management.89  
The court also reconciled this case with its recognition of the 
deepening insolvency damages theory in its earlier decision in Schacht 
v. Brown.90 In that case, the court formulated the theory of deepening 
insolvency based on the notion that an insolvent corporation’s 
shareholders would be harmed through additional borrowing.91 “A 
puzzling suggestion,” the court reasoned, “because by hypothesis a 
company harmed by deepening insolvency was insolvent before the 
borrowing spree, so what had the shareholders to lose?”92 The court 
did recognize that a corporation could be insolvent in the traditional 
sense—as by being unable to pay its debts as they become due—but 
could still be worth more liquidated than the total of its liabilities so as 
to remain valuable to the shareholders—precisely the scenario the 
court assumed possible in Schacht.93  
The court went on to say that Fehribach was different than other 
cases that could provide for damages based on deepening insolvency, 
because once Taurus became insolvent the owners lost their entire 
investments.94 Thus, there was nothing left for them to lose, and the 
only people that could be harmed by prolonging the corporation’s life 
were the creditors.95 Under Indiana law, which follows the privity rule 
of Ultramares, creditors without any contractual relationship to the 
auditor—which was the case with Taurus’s creditors—cannot file suit 
against the third party auditor.96 The court recognized that Taurus 
could sue Ernst & Young, because it was the corporation that had the 
                                                 
89 Id. at 908-9.  
90 Id. at 908. See also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983).  
91 Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 908 (citing Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1350).  
92 Id. at 908.  
93 Id. (citing Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1348).  
94 Id. at 909.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
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contractual relationship with the auditor.97 Realistically, the court 
acknowledged that any suit brought by the bankrupt Taurus would in 
effect be brought for the benefit of its creditors. However, rather than 
expressly stating the trustee lacked standing, the court decided that the 
trustee’s claim failed on the facts regardless of how the standing issue 
was resolved.98  
The fact that Taurus survived for more than a year after the audit 
provided by Ernst & Young was conducted was not central to the 
resolution of the case.99 Rather, the court categorized a going-concern 
qualification as a prediction, which may have to include items in the 
audit report that would result to foreseeable harm to the company if 
omitted.100 The point of an audit, the court noted, is for the auditing 
firm to look at the corporation’s financials, which are provided by the 
corporation, and make sure that they correspond to reality.101 Ernst & 
Young did not find any discrepancies between Taurus’s financials and 
its actual financial state because no such discrepancies existed.102 The 
court commented that Ernst & Young did fail to include a warning 
about the trends toward nationalization in the frozen food market but 
also stated that predicting Taurus’s cash flow beyond its financial 
statements was outside the purpose of the audit report.103 The court 
noted that “an auditor’s duty is not to give business advice; it is merely 
to paint an accurate picture of the audited firm’s financial condition, 
insofar as the condition is revealed by the company’s books and 
inventory and other sources of an auditor’s opinion.”104   
The court did note that the auditor has a duty to follow accounting 
standards; in other words, it must be alert to certain conditions that 
would prevent the company from continuing as a going concern when 
considered in the aggregate.105 These conditions include: negative 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 910.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 910-11.  
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trends, other indications of financial difficulties (defaults on loan 
agreements, restructuring of debt, need to seek new sources of 
financing, etc), internal matters such as work stoppages and other 
labor difficulties, and external matters that have occurred such as legal 
proceedings or loss of a key franchise.106 However, “nowhere is the 
auditor required to investigate external matters, as distinct from 
discovering them during the engagement.”107 Therefore, the court 
focused on the fact that Ernst & Young was not hired to assess the 
projected supply and demand for the industry, and it was impossible 
for Ernst & Young to know more about trends in the frozen food 
market than Taurus did itself.108 Relying on those facts, the court held 
that Ernst & Young was not liable to Taurus’s creditors for the losses 
the company suffered from the prolonged liquidation.109  
The court went on to note that not only was it possible to find for 
Ernst & Young on the merits, but the trustee’s claim was also barred 
by the one year statute of limitations in the Accountancy Act.110 Judge 
Rovner concurred in the opinion, stating that she would have limited 
the decision to whether the action was brought within the statute of 
limitations and would have barred the action on that issue alone.111 
 
B. The HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) 
LLC 
 
The HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) 
LLC involved a trust’s attempt to collect—for the sake of creditors—
from the debtor’s investment banker, Credit Suisse First Boston (now 
Credit Suisse Securities) (“Credit Suisse”).112 HA-LO Industries 
(“HA-LO”) manufactured and sold promotional products bearing 
                                                 
106 Id. at 911.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 911-12. 
111 Id. at 913.  
112 517 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2008).  
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company logos for employees and advertising purposes.113 In the 
1990s, HA-LO considered expanding its business into the e-commerce 
realm instead of focusing solely on traditional sales methods.114 In 
1999, John Kelley, HA-LO’s Chief Executive Officer decided that 
purchasing Starbelly.com, Inc. (“Starbelly”) was the most promising 
method of breaking into the e-commerce arena.115 Starbelly was a 
start-up company that was eating through its venture capital at a rate of 
$3 million per month and had yet to make a sale.116 Obviously, the 
proposition was risky, but Kelley had faith in Starbelly’s e-commerce 
system.117  
HA-LO enlisted the help of Credit Suisse as an investment banker 
and Ernst & Young as a business consultant in connection with its 
anticipated acquisition of Starbelly.118 Along with renegotiating the 
price of the sale and working out a pay structure to avoid placing HA-
LO in violation of its loan covenants, Credit Suisse also issued a 
fairness opinion representing that as of the date of the opinion 
(January 17, 2000), “the Merger Consideration is fair to HA-LO from 
a financial point of view.” 119 The fairness opinion issued by Credit 
Suisse and its engagement letter with HA-LO both specified that it had 
relied on—but not verified—HA-LO’s financial projections.120 
Verification of the financial projections was left up to Ernst & Young, 
which informed Kelley that Starbelly would not generate nearly the 
                                                 
113 Id. at 455. 
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Id. 
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 455-56. Fairness opinions can be issued in a number of significant 
corporate transactions and are most often issued to a company’s board of directors 
when that company is selling itself or acquiring another company. Tariq Mundiya, 
Fairness Opinions: Courts Scrutinize the Role of Investment Banks, 5/29/2008 
N.Y.L.J. 5, (col. 1) (2008).  
120 HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 456. 
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amount of revenue he had projected.121 Kelley, however, refused to 
accept the more realistic projections provided by Ernst & Young.122  
In April of 2000, HA-LO sent its shareholders a proxy 
solicitation, which included the fairness opinion issued by Credit 
Suisse. HA-LO’s investors approved the merger, and the deal was 
closed in May 2000.123 Shortly thereafter, HA-LO entered a 
tumultuous financial period triggered both by the large cash payout to 
Starbelly and Starbelly’s continuing losses.124 In January 2001, HA-
LO entered bankruptcy.125 After HA-LO reorganized, a successor 
emerged, as well as a liquidating trust. 126 The trust, known as 
HA2003 Liquidating Trust, was set up to collect from anyone 
associated with HA-LO’s failed transactions and to distribute the 
proceeds to HA-LO’s pre-bankruptcy creditors.127 The trust filed a 
complaint against Credit Suisse alleging the investment banker 
grossly negligent in preparing its fairness opinion.
was 
 the Seventh Circuit.  
                                                
128 After a bench 
trial in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the 
court found that Credit Suisse was not grossly negligent in preparing 
its fairness opinion; the trust appealed to 129
The case was decided on February 20, 2008 with an opinion 
issued by Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook.130 The court noted that the 
district court had found that it could not label the investment bank’s 
behavior grossly negligent because it was only doing what its contract 
with HA-LO required it to do.131 The district court also found that 
HA-LO’s Chief Executive Officer and board members knew 
 
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Id.; A proxy solicitation is defined as a “request that a corporate shareholder 
authorize another person to cast the shareholder’s vote at a corporate meeting.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
124 HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 456. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 455. 
131 Id. at 456.  
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everything they accused Credit Suisse of ignoring, which would make
assessing damages impossible.
 
as not met.   
                                                
132 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit 
reviewed these factual findings using a clearly erroneous standard, 
which the court concluded w 133
Although the trust urged the court to consider whether fairness 
opinions were just “worthless (but expensive) paper,” the court refused 
to be pulled into the debate, finding that the question had no bearing 
on the outcome of the case.134 The court did state that requiring 
investment banks to treat fairness opinions as insurance would only 
raise the price of these decisions, thereby having a detrimental effect 
on the market.135 Such insurance, the court reasoned, would be 
cheaper when achieved through the stock market and the ability of 
investors to diversify their holdings.136 The Seventh Circuit is known 
for seizing the opportunity to promote the free market in its decisions, 
and its line of rationale discussing the “efficient market” in The 
HA2003 Liquidating Trust does not differ in that regard.137  
While the court took the chance to discuss market principles, its 
decision to not hold Credit Suisse liable primarily relied on the fact 
that the financial adviser not only acted according to normal business 
standards but, more importantly, had performed its contract with HA-
LO to the letter.138 Credit Suisse relied on the numbers provided by 
HA-LO in formulating its fairness opinion, and though those numbers 
may have been wrong, Credit Suisse did not have the duty to ensure 
their accuracy.139 That task was left up to (and completed by) Ernst & 
Young.140 It was HA-LO’s choice to not provide Credit Suisse with 
 
132 Id. at 456-57.  
133 Id. at 457. The clearly erroneous standard requires that a reviewing judge 
have a “definite and firm conviction” that an error was committed. Dickinson v. 
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).  
134 HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 457.  
135 Id. at 458. 
136 Id. 
137 Dominic J. Campisi, Representing Estate and Trust Beneficiaries and 
Fiduciaries, SP004 ALI-ABA 1, 10-11 (2008).  
138 HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d at 457. 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
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those numbers but instead to ask the investment bank to tender the 
fairness opinion using numbers generated by HA-LO itself.141  
The trust also argued that Credit Suisse should have foreseen the 
end of the dot-com boom, an argument the court deemed an “appeal to 
hindsight.”142 The court went on to say that if everyone knew the dot-
com boom was ending, as the trust asserted, then Credit Suisse had no 
duty to revise its opinion as the trust argued it should have done.143 
Not only would have it been unnecessary to restate what the investing 
public could clearly see, but Credit Suisse was hired to deliver an 
opinion as of one date, which is exactly what it did.144 Finally, the 
trust asked the court to throw out the contract between the parties 
impose a separate set of duties on Credit Suisse.
and 
                                                
145 The court refused 
to do so, citing the principle that, “[i]ntelligent adults can enforce their 
own standards of performance, and courts must enforce the deal they 
have struck.”146  
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, reached the same general 
conclusion as in Fehribach—that the third party professional was not 
liable—by tailoring its focus to the contract between the parties as that 
contract was written.147  
 
C. Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. 
 
In the last of the trilogy of cases, Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 
Inc., the shareholders and option holders brought suit against the 
business’s financial advisor for constructive fraud stemming from the 
advisor’s failure to address ways to hedge their risks.148 Edward T. 
 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 458.  
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 459.  
148 538 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2008). Hedging entails the “use of two compensating 
or offsetting transactions to ensure a position of breaking even; to make advance 
arrangements to safeguard oneself from loss on an investment, speculation, or bet.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
80 
 
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol4/iss1/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 4, Issue 1                           Fall 2008 
 
Joyce and the other plaintiffs were shareholders and option holders in 
21st Century Telecom Group (“21st Century”).149 On December 12, 
1999, 21st century entered into a merger agreement with RCN 
Corporation (“RCN”) whereby RCN would acquire all of 21st 
Century’s common stock.150 Morgan Stanley advised 21st Century in 
connection with the merger.151 Unfortunately for the shareholders, 
between the date of the merger agreement and the effective date of the 
merger in April of 2000 RCN’s stock value plummeted.152 The newly 
acquired stock ended up worthless.153  
The shareholders filed suit against Morgan Stanley alleging 
constructive fraud on the part of the financial advisor.154 This fraud, 
the shareholders claimed, stemmed from Morgan Stanley’s failure to 
advise them how to minimize their exposure to any potential decline in 
the value of the RCN stock.155 Morgan Stanley filed a motion to 
dismiss based on an alleged lack of standing, failure to state a claim, 
and failure to sue within the statutory limitation period, which the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted.156 The 
shareholders appealed to the Seventh Circuit.157 
 Judge Diane P. Wood issued the court’s opinion in Joyce, which 
was decided on August 19, 2008.158 The decision held that debtor’s 
financial advisor, Morgan Stanley, could not be held liable to 21st 
Century’s stockholders and option holders under a constructive fraud 
theory.159 The court began by stating that the shareholders did have 
                                                 
149 Joyce, 538 F.3d at 799.  
150Id. Common stock is “a class of stock entitling the holder to vote on 
corporate matters, to receive dividends after other claims and dividends have been 
paid (esp. to preferred shareholders), and to share in assets upon liquidation.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
151 Joyce, 538 F.3d at 799. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 800.  
155 Id. at 799.  
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 799. 
159 Id. at 802.  
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standing to bring the suit because their claims were direct rather than 
derivative.160 The shareholders alleged that their losses were based on 
a failure to hedge rather than a drop in stock prices.161 21st Century as 
a corporation did not suffer any loss related to the lack of hedging 
advice because 21st Century did not receive any RCN stock in the 
transaction.162 The court stated that while it was willing to 
acknowledge that the shareholders had standing to bring the action, the 
real issue turned on whether Morgan Stanley had a duty to give 
hedging advice.163   
Considering the issue of whether Morgan Stanley had a duty to 
give hedging advice was imperative to the resolution of the 
shareholders’ constructive fraud claims.164 Constructive fraud differs 
from actual fraud in that it does not require actual dishonesty or the 
intent to deceive; rather, the law imposes liability simply because of 
the act’s tendency to deceive.165 The claim of constructive fraud 
requires either a confidential or a fiduciary relationship between the 
parties.166 In their complaint, the shareholders asserted that they had a 
confidential relationship with Morgan Stanley, and that Morgan 
Stanley did in fact owe them a fiduciary duty.167 The shareholders 
alleged that the fairness opinion provided by Morgan Stanley 
constituted a breach of that fiduciary duty because it was not based on 
an independent investigation, it failed to address the risks associated 
with the transactions, and it did not identify the ways the shareholders 
could hedge those risks to minimize losses.168  
                                                 
160 Id. at 799-800. A direct claim may be brought when the shareholder suffers 
a harm that is separate and distinct from the harm suffered by the corporation. The 
claim is derivate when the harm to the shareholder is shared by the corporation. 18 
C.J.S. Corporations §485 (2008).  
161 Joyce, 538 F.3d at 800.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id.  
166 Id. 
167 Id.  
168 Id. at 801.  
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The shareholders also alleged a conflict of interest based on the 
fiduciary duty they claimed Morgan Stanley owed them.169 This 
conflict, the shareholders claimed, arose from the fact that Morgan 
Stanley had previously advised RCN in connection with the merger—a 
fact that was disclosed to the shareholders in Morgan Stanley’s 
engagement letter.170 Finally, rather than ask the court to find that the 
alleged breach of duty lie in the fairness opinion, the shareholders 
asked the court to look beyond the terms of that opinion (and beyond 
what was alleged in their complaint) to find that Morgan Stanley owed 
them an extra-contractual duty to provide advice relating to hedging 
strategies.171 The extra-contractual duty, the shareholders contended, 
arose out of the special circumstances surrounding the relationship 
between the parties. 172 
The court rejected each of the above arguments made by the 
shareholders.173 First, the court acknowledged that 21st Century was 
willing to engage Morgan Stanley despite the fact that it knew the firm 
had previously advised RCN.174 This willingness, the court suggested, 
actually indicated that 21st Century was hoping a breach of fiduciary 
duty by Morgan Stanley would cut in its favor—as 21st admitted it 
hired the firm even though it knew Morgan Stanley had a substantial 
amount of knowledge concerning RCN’s business and capital 
structure.175 The court determined, however, that 21st Century’s 
motivations for engaging RCN were irrelevant, as the allegations that 
Morgan Stanley breached its duty to the shareholders were the focus of 
the case.176 
In determining whether a breach of duty occurred, the court 
reasoned that even if it chose to overlook the fact that this extra-
                                                 
169 Id. 
170 Id. Morgan Stanley discontinued providing services to RCN when it began 
advising 21st Century in connection with the proposed merger. Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 801-02. 
174 Id. at 801.  
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
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contractual duty was not pleaded in the complaint, the shareholders 
could not show that special circumstances existed that would give rise 
to that duty.177 One necessary circumstance is that the allegedly 
superior party must have accepted the duty to protect the interests of 
the dependent party.178 The court noted that no such evidence existed 
to suggest that Morgan Stanley accepted this duty on behalf of the 
shareholders.179 In fact, Morgan Stanley’s engagement letter specified 
that the advisor was working only for the corporation.180 The court 
compared this case to The HA2003 Liquidating Trust because 
“[wishing] that a different contract had been written is not a basis for 
liability.”181  
Finally, the court noted that it could have also upheld the district 
court’s judgment based on the shareholder’s failure to sue within the 
statutory limitations period.182 The shareholders should have been put 
on notice that they needed to investigate whether they were wrongfully 
deprived of the means needed to prevent their losses on the effective 
date of the merger agreement.183 Investigating whether hedging 
strategies were available would have taken little effort on the 
shareholders part, and because the standard for knowledge is objective 
rather than subjective, the shareholders could not claim that the statute 
of limitations period was triggered at the moment they learned of the 
availability of hedging strategies rather than the moment they learned 
they had experienced a loss.184   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
177 Id. at 802.  
178 Id. 
179 Id.  
180 Id. 
181 Id.  
182 Id. at 803.  
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT: HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT IN 
NEED OF A STRAIGHTER PATH  
 
A. Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce Were 
Correctly Decided 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s recent decisions in Fehribach, The 
 HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce are a step in the right direction 
when applied to the question of how far to extend liability for a 
debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals. This trilogy indicates that the 
Seventh Circuit is reluctant, or even unwilling, to extend liability to 
these professionals absent any specific misconduct on their part.185  
 These decisions were careful not to shut out the possibility for 
professional liability based on a standing issue alone—such as whether 
there was privity of contract or a duty owed by the professional to a 
third party.186 Failing to consider the merits of these cases and 
disposing them on a lack of standing alone would have been 
nonsensical. As the court noted in Fehribach, Taurus, the bankrupt 
company, obviously had standing to sue its pre-bankruptcy 
professionals because of the contractual relationship it shared with 
those professionals.187 If Taurus would have been solvent at the time it 
was injured by the auditing firm’s alleged negligence any suit brought 
against the auditor would have been brought for the benefit of its 
shareholders—even though the shareholders themselves could not 
have sued the auditor.188 The court went on to state that while it was 
true that Ernst & Young had no duty to Taurus’s creditors, it did have a 
duty to Taurus—a duty that did not evaporate because Taurus was 
bankrupt, and it was its creditors who would receive the benefit from a 
                                                 
185 See Fehribach v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 493 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 
2007)(Rovner, J., concurring); HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities 
(USA) LLC, 517 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2008); Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,,538 F.3d 
797 (7th Cir. 2008).  
186 See Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 909 (“The trustee’s claim fails nevertheless, but 
fails on the facts”).  
187 Id. at 909.  
188 Id. 
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successful suit.189 By this rationale, the court’s decision to not dispose 
of any of the aforementioned cases on lack of standing alone was the 
logical approach. Also, it should be noted that in Fehribach the court 
was dealing with the strict privity rule espoused by Ultramares, yet it 
still chose to reach a decision on the merits.190  
 Although Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and Joyce 
were decided on the merits, two of these cases—Fehribach and 
Joyce—could have been resolved by simply holding that the suits were 
not brought within the statutory limitations period.191 The fact that the 
court decided to discuss the merits of each of these cases before 
holding that the actions were also barred by the statute of limitations 
indicates that the court wanted to use these cases to espouse its general 
views regarding the extension of liability to outside professionals. In 
doing so, the court acknowledged its unwillingness to hold 
professionals liable for actions that were not required by their 
engagement letters—without shutting out the possibility that such an 
action could exist.192 The court, however, could have devised an 
analytical framework that would have made its inquiries into the facts 
of each case much simpler.  
 
B. The Three Prong Test for Equitable Subordination as a Guideline 
for Devising an Efficient Analytical Framework for Professional 
Liability Claims 
 
 It is possible to formulate an initial analytical framework for 
determining whether these professionals can be held liable for the 
services they rendered to a debtor pre-bankruptcy—whether the suit is 
                                                 
189 Id.  
190 Id. 
191 493 F.3d at 911; 538 F.3d at 803.  
192 Compare HA2003 Liquidating Trust, 517 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“The engagement contract says CSFB has no duty to double-check the 
predictions. . .CSFB did what it was hired to do), with Fehribach, 493 F.3d at 910 
(“The requirement that the auditor disclose in its report any substantial doubt it has 
that the firm will still be a going concern in a year expands the auditor’s duty beyond 
that of verifying the accuracy of the company’s financial statements”).  
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brought under a fraud, negligence, or deepening insolvency damages 
theory. Furthermore, the rule utilized should be similar to a rule 
applied in a different context—to the question of whether a lender’s 
claim can be equitably subordinated.193 In considering whether a claim 
can be equitably subordinated, the Seventh Circuit —as well as other 
circuits—follows a three-prong balancing test that considers whether: 
“(1) the claimant creditor has engaged in some sort of inequitable 
misconduct; (2) the misconduct has resulted in an injury to other 
creditors or an unfair advantage to the miscreant; and (3) 
subordination of the debt is inconsistent with the other provisions of 
the bankruptcy code.”194  
 While some courts have held that inequitable conduct is not 
required for subordination, such conduct is a requirement when 
attempting to subordinate the claims of a secured lender.195 Generally, 
financial lending institutions do not owe a duty to their borrowers; 
however, an exception to this rule exists when the lending institution 
exerts “dominion or control” over the debtor.196 A close relationship 
between the lender and the debtor is not considered sufficient; the 
lender must exercise enough control over the debtor to both influence 
corporate policy and the disposition of assets.197 Thus, a lender’s claim 
will not be equitably subordinated unless it is proven that the lender 
actually controlled the debtor.198  
 Applying the aforementioned rule as an initial step to determining 
the potential liability of a debtor’s pre-bankruptcy professionals would 
                                                 
193 Equitable subordination represents the power of the bankruptcy court under 
§ 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to reprioritize claims in a bankruptcy case if the 
court determines the claimant has engaged in misconduct that either injures other 
creditors or confers on unfair advantage on the claimant. In re Kreisler, 2008 WL 
4613880 *864, *866 (7th Cir.). See also 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2008).  
194 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Citicorp North America (In 
re Aluminum Mills Corp.), 132 B.R. 869, 893 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citing the three prong 
balancing test of In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 702 (5th Cir. 1977).  
195 Aluminum Mills, 132 B.R. at 893. 
196 Id. at 894. 
197 Id. 
198 See id.  
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establish a bright line rule for creditor’s claiming they were owed 
duties outside of the scope of what was required in their engagement 
letters—professionals will not be liable for the alleged negligence 
unless they exercised control over the debtor that amounted to a 
dictatorship over corporate policy.199 This test would be easier to 
apply than and would eliminate the need for the court’s current 
approach of looking at each case on a fact by fact basis to determine 
liability for whether fairness opinions should have amended, or market
trends and other external factors should have been considered, or 
numbers should have been verified. The test would also create a 
balance by ensuring that outside professionals are held accountable for
their actions when exerting control over the debtor—a balance that 
will not be achieved by simply inquiring into whether an engagem
letter required a s
 
 
ent 
pecific action.  
                                                
 As further support, the proposed test falls squarely in line with the 
Seventh Circuit’s reasoning against finding lender liability in the 
context of equitable subordination. For example, in Kham & Nate’s 
Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, the court noted the general 
lack of cases subordinating the claims of creditors that dealt only at 
arm’s length with the debtor.200 The debtor in Kham urged the court to 
find that the lender’s conduct could be inequitable even though the 
lender had complied with all of its contractual obligations.201 The 
court rejected this argument, stating they were “not willing to embrace 
a rule that requires participants in commercial transactions not only to 
keep their contracts but also do ‘more’—just how much more resting 
in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the situation years 
later.”202 Surely, the rule proposed in this Article would take any 
discretion out of the hands of a bankruptcy judge as to whether a 
professional without control over the debtor was required to do 
 
199 Of course, if the alleged negligence or breach lies within the performance of 
duties required by the professional’s engagement letter then the claims should be 
analyzed in accordance with the elements of standard tort and contract claims.  
200 908 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1990).  
201 Id.  
202 Id.  
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“more”—an outcome that would seem welcomed by the Seventh 
Circuit.  
  
CONCLUSION  
 
The Seventh Circuit rightfully concluded that an outside 
professional was not liable for the bankruptcy or financial loss of the 
company it advised in Fehribach, The HA2003 Liquidating Trust, and 
Joyce. The plaintiffs in each of these cases were only seeking, as Chief 
Judge Easterbrook put it, “a deep pocket to reimburse investors for the 
costs of managers’ blunders.”203 These plaintiffs brought suit against 
the professionals based on claims for breach of contract, negligence, 
constructive fraud, and under the deepening insolvency damages 
theory—all common theories of liability that professionals are sued 
under throughout other circuit and lower federal courts. The Seventh 
Circuit did not expressly state that the third party plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring any of the claims; rather, the court decided each case 
on the merits. In doing so, the court rejected each claim brought 
against the professionals in all three cases on a fact by fact basis.  
The court’s failure to outline a general analytical framework in 
any of its decisions, however, will surely lead to the exercise of 
judicial direction as to whether these professionals can be held liable. 
A clear rule is necessary to simplify the liability question for these 
professionals in the Seventh Circuit as well as in the other circuit 
courts and lower federal courts. The imperativeness of such a rule is 
especially apparent in the current economic climate—where 
management in a number of industries has been blamed for their 
respective industry’s collapse or potential collapse.204 If these 
                                                 
203 HA2003 Liquidating Trust v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, 517 F.3d 
454, 457 (7th Cir. 2008).  
204 See Mitt Romney, Let Detroit Go Bankrupt , NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/opinion/19romney.html?_r=1 (“don’t ask 
Washington to give shareholders, , .a free pass—they bet on management and they 
lost”); Julie Hirschfield Davis, Lehman’s Golden Parachutes Were Being Secured 
While Execs Were Pleading for Federal Rescue, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 6, 
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industries do fail, there is always the possibility that their creditors will 
go after the outside professional advisors as a means of recovery. A 
clear cut rule delineating when these advisors can be held liable would 
eliminate the need for the federal courts to examine each case on a fact 
by fact basis to determine what actions, if any, the advisor could have 
taken on behalf of the struggling business and whether they were 
actually obligated to take those actions irrespective of whether their 
engagement letters required it.  
The rule used for determining when these professionals can be 
held liable should be similar to the rule applied to the question of 
whether a secured lender’s claim can be equitably subordinated. In 
other words, plaintiffs alleging that a professional should have done 
more to warn them about the financial condition of the business the 
professional advised should first be required to prove that the 
professional exercised control over the debtor. Such a rule would not 
only ensure that professionals performing their contractual duties to 
the letter would not be held liable by third parties seeking a deep 
pocket, but it would also balance the detrimental effects of holding 
that a professional is not liable for actions not required by their 
engagement letter when that professional was exercising actual control 
over the debtor.    
                                                                                                                   
2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/10/06/lehmans-golden-
parachutes_n_132258.html (“culture of entitlement” among Lehman management); 
Peter Whoriskey, AIG Spa Trip Fuels Fury on Hill, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 
2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/07/AR2008100702604_pf.html (a week before former 
AIG CEO told investors company was confident in their valuation methods, 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, AIG’s auditor, had warned them that they could have a 
material weakness in that area).  
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